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“[S]overeign debt is a complex political institution, which cannot be reduced to 
creditor coordination or any other contract problem.”
The Strained Marriage of Public Debts  
and Private Contracts
ANNA GELPERN
As a new year begins, governments around the world are poised for another cycle of debt disputes and missed payments. Ven-
ezuela is stumbling into default after starving its 
people for years to pay foreign creditors. Its hard 
currency reserves are drying up under pressure 
from US sanctions as the government battles hy-
perinflation, runs out of things to sell to China 
and Russia, and tries to buy time with a wacky vir-
tual currency scheme. 
Meanwhile, Ukraine and Puerto Rico will each 
go to court in January to fend off debt collectors. 
Ukraine has appealed an English court decision 
that would enforce its debt to Russia as if it were 
an ordinary commercial contract, despite Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, crippling trade sanctions, 
and sponsorship of separatist conflict in eastern 
Ukraine. A fund known for making a fortune 
from suing Argentina has challenged a US federal 
law enacted in 2016 that promised bankruptcy-
style debt relief for Puerto Rico. If the fund wins, 
hopes for a fresh start for the hurricane-battered 
commonwealth and an equitable resolution for its 
creditors would dim. 
On the bright side, Greece plans to exit the mul-
tilateral lending programs that many of its citizens 
had come to associate with economic collapse, aus-
terity, and loss of policy autonomy. It aims to return 
to the private financial markets in the fall of 2018. 
Looming in the background is its debt to euro area 
governments, which will take generations to repay.
Each of these crises is intensely political, even 
constitutional, but politics is barely visible in to-
day’s sovereign debt restructuring regime. This in-
formal regime coalesced in the 1980s and 1990s 
around a relatively stable transatlantic core of gov-
ernments, international organizations, and private 
creditor groups, and depended on coordination 
among them. Throughout this period, private cap-
ital flows grew in size and importance to sovereign 
finance. In response, debt contract reform moved 
to the forefront of the policy agenda, and quietly 
took over.
Private contracts are the foundation of private 
capital movements. The catch phrases “freedom 
of contract” and “sanctity of contract” capture 
the ideal: debtors and creditors freely agree on 
the terms of their relationship up front, and must 
abide by this private constitution in good times 
and bad. Domestic courts step in only to resolve 
disputes.
When governments borrow in the private fi-
nancial markets, they enter into private debt con-
tracts. These contracts are highly standardized, 
which makes them easy to trade. In a world where 
governments borrow primarily from the private 
markets, changing contracts is an appealing way 
to deal with sovereign debt crises. The trouble 
is, governments are very different from private 
debtors. Trying to solve public debt problems by 
changing private contracts is at best inadequate. 
At worst, it can backfire and complicate crisis re-
sponse.
CONTRACT LOGIC
The logic of public debt policy investing so 
heavily in private contract design is intriguing. 
It holds that crises would be less frequent, less 
protracted, and less damaging if only debtors and 
creditors could tweak a few words in their IOUs. 
Well-designed contracts might even make govern-
ments prudent and creditors collaborative.
The idea has a long and respectable pedigree. 
In the 1930s, when the US Congress was debat-
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ing municipal bankruptcy legislation, experts at 
the League of Nations weighed the relative mer-
its of a debt-restructuring treaty for governments 
against debt contract clauses that would let credi-
tors voluntarily reduce their claims by majority 
vote. Unlike municipal bankruptcy, sovereign 
bankruptcy was a political nonstarter then, and 
remains one now. A treaty never came to pass; 
World War II put contract reform projects on the 
back burner, while private markets for most gov-
ernment debt remained frozen for decades. Con-
tract reform came back when the private markets 
revived in the late twentieth century; it has pros-
pered over time and across wildly different insti-
tutional contexts.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, a dis-
tressed sovereign would normally secure emer-
gency funding from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), tied to economic reforms. The 
agreement would anticipate a mix of domestic 
savings and measures to boost revenue, new bor-
rowing, and debt relief. The debtor would then 
seek concessions from its con-
stituents: economic sacrifice 
from its citizens, debt relief or 
new money from its creditors. 
Different creditor groups—
governments, banks, bond-
holders—held distinct claims 
on the debtor, and negotiated 
separately. The entire process was implicitly an-
chored in the IMF, and the whole system held to-
gether when each group linked its contributions 
to those of the others. The job of debt contracts 
was to coordinate private creditors and deter free 
riders.
This set of nonbinding but reasonably predict-
able practices evolved from one crisis to another, 
and delivered just enough relief to the debtors and 
returns to the creditors to preempt more radical 
proposals, especially a sovereign bankruptcy trea-
ty. To be sure, the regime was far from perfect. It 
was notoriously slow, stingy, and unaccountable. 
By 2010, it showed signs of strain.
New private and government creditors, such 
as China, Russia, and the Gulf states, were only 
provisionally invested in the old restructuring in-
stitutions. The IMF shrank by comparison with 
private capital flows, and its ability to anchor cri-
sis responses on its own was openly questioned. 
Regional safety nets emerged as complements 
and competitors to the IMF in Asia and in Eu-
rope. Meanwhile, contract reform gained visibil-
ity and became firmly entrenched in the policy 
repertoire. Early in the European debt crisis, in 
November 2010, euro area governments prom-
ised to change their contracts as part of a new 
regional crisis management and liquidity support 
scheme.
The New York Times recognized the importance 
of contracts in a 2014 editorial: responding to US 
court rulings that directed Argentina to pay hold-
out creditors in full if it made scheduled payments 
on its restructured or new debt, the editorial called 
on governments to adopt majority amendment 
terms in their bonds to avoid Argentina’s fate. Ma-
jority amendment clauses (also known as collec-
tive action clauses or CACs) typically set out a pro-
cedure by which creditors owed money under the 
same contract can vote to change the debt terms. 
For example, a supermajority of three-quarters 
might agree to reduce principal or defer interest 
payments. Recent variations on CACs allow credi-
tors under multiple contracts to aggregate into a 
single voting pool. Versions of majority amend-
ment found their way into most 
new sovereign bonds by 2017.
For all their prominence and 
recent success, sovereign debt 
contracts are unlikely levers 
for reform, for several reasons. 
First, government promises are 
hard to enforce. No court can 
make a sovereign do as it is told, since national 
borders and sovereign immunity shield its assets 
and keep its officials out of jail. Why spend scarce 
policy resources finessing unenforceable boiler-
plate? 
Second, standard-form bond contracts are noto-
riously hard to change. Academic studies confirm 
market reports that these contracts are “sticky”—
slow to assimilate new terms even if they would 
improve on the status quo. Sovereign bond con-
tracts might be stickier than most, because their 
role in the financial system generally requires 
them to be actively traded. Forcing investors to 
pause and analyze new words might scare off buy-
ers. It took years and several rounds of concerted 
intervention by world leaders to make majority 
amendment clauses the norm across the foreign 
sovereign bond markets. Yet their impact may be 
small or uncertain, depending on the precise for-
mulation and other factors.
Third, private contracts are private. Unlike stat-
utes and treaties, contracts are made behind closed 
doors between debtors and creditors, some of 
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whom happen to be sovereign governments. Inter-
national officials have no comparative advantage 
in drafting the terms, and no sure way to enforce 
compliance. Decentralization, lack of information, 
and coordination problems among governments 
and market participants make contracts an awk-
ward policy vehicle.
LEFT OUT
Despite such practical objections, contracts re-
main popular because they can deliver some of the 
creditor collective action benefits of bankruptcy 
without arousing the same level of political hos-
tility. For technocrats and politicians, contract 
reform has become a pragmatic problem-solving 
approach that does no apparent harm. Missing 
from this calculus is the idea that sovereign debt 
is a complex political institution, which cannot 
be reduced to creditor coordination or any oth-
er contract problem. The biggest risk of putting 
so much energy into contract reform lies not in 
contracts per se, but rather in what falls by the 
wayside.
Framing public debt as 
a private contract problem 
leaves essential questions 
outside the frame. Consider 
Venezuela, where no amount 
of tinkering with contracts 
would convince the gov-
ernment to secure enough debt relief from its 
creditors to feed its people. Consider Ukraine, 
whose president rushed to borrow $3 billion 
from Russia shortly before he was driven from 
power and Russia annexed Crimea. His succes-
sors got stuck repaying a creditor that did its 
best to sabotage Ukraine’s economy, boycotted 
restructuring talks, and sued to enforce the debt 
contract in an English court. Consider Greece, 
which enacted pathbreaking changes to its for-
eign bond contracts, and—after an elegantly 
executed restructuring of most bonds held by 
private creditors—was left with a mountain of 
debt to euro area governments.
In each case, better contracts might smooth the 
debt restructuring process or buy time to design 
a solution to the crisis; in no case are they them-
selves the solution. Using private bond contracts 
as a substitute for public institution-building does 
not simply leave core questions unaddressed. It 
can do new damage by encouraging free riders, 
undermining government accountability, and 
seeding future political conflict.
FREE RIDING
Hedge funds that make a killing by suing poor 
countries over defaulted debts are the bête noire of 
sovereign debt policy. These “vulture funds” have 
long supplied the core rationale for majority modi-
fication clauses in sovereign bonds, since they free 
ride on the sacrifices of other creditors and the 
country’s citizens.
The fifteen-year battle between Argentina and 
a handful of funds in US federal courts validated 
the contract narrative. The most aggressive and 
patient vultures recouped more than 1,000 per-
cent of their investment in 2016. Court sanctions 
that prompted Argentina to default on all its debt 
rather than pay the holdouts, and then eventually 
drove it to settle with them, hinged on a single 
clause. Judges stressed that debtors and credi-
tors could avoid a bad outcome by changing their 
contracts. In response, financial industry groups 
worked hand in hand with policy makers to de-
sign and promote new model contract terms.
But vulture funds were not the biggest hold-
outs in the most recent sover-
eign bond restructurings. In-
stead, the honors went to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) 
in Greece and to Russia’s sov-
ereign wealth fund in Ukraine. 
In 2012, the ECB escaped hair-
cuts on more than $60 billion 
in Greek bonds identical to those that got written 
down by 60 percent in the hands of private credi-
tors and Norwegian and Chinese government in-
vestment funds. (The ECB swapped its bonds for 
new ones with different serial numbers.) In a later 
submission to Germany’s federal constitutional 
court, the ECB said it would vote against restruc-
turing sovereign bonds in its portfolio, since it 
lacked authority to compromise its claims.
While Greece chose to stay in the euro area 
and keep paying the ECB, Ukraine tried to walk 
away from its debt to Russia. When the bond 
trustee sued on Russia’s behalf, the English court 
acknowledged that it was not dealing with a 
garden-variety obligation. However, the judge 
would not consider Ukraine’s claims that Russia 
had pressured it into borrowing the money and 
later undermined its capacity to repay. He held 
that claims of duress in the case involved matters 
of public international law and fell beyond the 
purview of local commercial courts—and that 
Russian interference with Ukraine’s repayment 
was not expressly barred by contract. Because 
Politics is barely visible  
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the debt took the form of potentially “transfer-
able financial instruments” (Russia still held the 
lot), the court would not reach beyond “the four 
corners of the relevant contracts” to punish ineq-
uitable behavior.
Greece showed that contract form could be ig-
nored to spare the ECB. Ukraine showed that con-
tract form could be leveraged to Russia’s advan-
tage. Both free-riding opportunities arose from a 
mismatch between the impersonal, standardized 
contract form and the complex political relation-
ship between the debtor and the creditor. Other 
central banks and sovereign wealth funds would 
be hard-pressed not to exploit such an opportu-
nity where they had the power to do so.
Ideal bond contracts are a little like money, su-
premely easy to transfer and trade without regard 
to the particular debtor-creditor relationship. Yet 
government-to-government lending is mixed-
motive, never entirely arm’s length, impossible to 
strip of political and policy considerations. Gov-
ernments have extrajudicial means of protecting 
their interests, using diplomacy, trade, or military 
force.
A creditor unconstrained by commercial mo-
tives could be altruistic and patient, but could just 
as easily use its position to bully or extract strate-
gic concessions from the sovereign debtor. It could 
go to court to embarrass the debtor, or cause po-
litical trouble, even if doing so made little financial 
sense. It does not need contracts to get paid, and 
it can choose to use contracts for commercial or 
noncommercial ends. In today’s sovereign debt re-
structuring regime, a government creditor holding 
a bond can choose to act as an official or private 
creditor, and change its mind at any time.
Looking back at the Greek and Ukrainian expe-
riences, it should come as no surprise that bond 
contracts are ill-equipped to manage political con-
flict. No amount of drafting finesse can change 
that. When clauses designed to coordinate a dis-
crete subset of creditors are called on to respond 
to constitutional and geopolitical crises, they will 
fall short, and may backfire. This does not mean 
that contracts or contract reforms are worthless, 
but rather that they are a limited tool, which tends 
to get overloaded in sovereign debt for lack of po-
litically palatable alternatives.
TWILIGHT IN CARACAS
If the contract form was ignored in Greece and 
abused in Ukraine, it is even more vulnerable in 
Venezuela. The sovereign and the state oil con-
glomerate PDVSA together owe at least $60 billion 
to bondholders, somewhere in the neighborhood 
of $25 billion to China and $10 billion to Russia, 
and billions more to investors and suppliers. The 
increasingly repressive and erratic government of 
President Nicolás Maduro has shrunk imports, 
abandoned investment, and failed to meet the ba-
sic human needs of its population in an effort to 
keep up the debt payments while the economy 
crumbles.
It is hard to explain why a leftist government 
would take food and medicine from the poor 
to pay Wall Street, which has long priced in de-
fault. Venezuelan officials may believe that default 
would put the country’s oil tankers at risk of be-
ing seized by creditors on the high seas, cut off 
export revenues, and endanger the regime’s hold 
on power. Rumors of bonds owned by insiders and 
other corrupt schemes have been floating around 
for years. Whatever the reason, the case highlights 
an underappreciated dimension of sovereign im-
munity: just as no one can force a sovereign to pay 
on command, no one can force it to default.
In Venezuela’s case, it has not been for lack of 
trying. The United States has ratcheted up sanc-
tions against Venezuelan entities and Maduro as-
sociates. After the government sidelined the oppo-
sition-dominated legislature in 2017, US sanctions 
effectively blocked it from issuing new debt or re-
negotiating the old bonds. By year’s end, sanctions 
had begun to interfere with debt payments and at-
tempts to settle trade and investment disputes.
China and Russia kept the Maduro government 
afloat for several years with cash infusions and 
critical inputs, mostly in exchange for future oil 
deliveries. Both sought dirt-cheap oil and strategic 
assets, but their case for sponsorship weakened 
over the course of 2017 as oil production fell and 
Maduro lurched from one desperate measure to 
the next. Chinese and Russian entities have sued; 
Russia even seized a tanker in the Caribbean. 
With relatively small amounts of unpaid invoices 
at stake, the government was quick to settle. Such 
lawsuits would not trigger regime change; they do, 
however, point to looming financial constraints 
and aggressive enforcement.
Contracts have been marginal to Venezuela’s 
story so far, notwithstanding voluminous com-
mentary on its bond terms in market reports and 
academic publications. Few expected the Maduro 
government to last this long, or to default and 
still hang on to power. Many foreign creditors had 
planned on a new market-friendly government, the 
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lifting of sanctions, a comprehensive workout un-
der the auspices of the IMF, and maybe bankruptcy 
for PDVSA. In this scenario, contracts would take 
center stage. For as long as default happens under 
the current government and against its wishes, the 
restructuring path is muddled.
While bondholders are still debating whether 
the government is in default, new investor and 
supplier lawsuits crop up daily. Venezuela has 
settled a handful, including one brought by a Ca-
nadian firm that pursued an especially skillful and 
aggressive litigation strategy. The terms were re-
portedly favorable to the investor—which should 
encourage imitators—but details are sketchy.
The financial and legal terms of China’s and 
Russia’s contracts are also a mystery. Both govern-
ments gave Venezuela breathing room in the past, 
but there is no guarantee that they would partici-
pate in a broad-based restructuring. If they do, 
they might decide to treat their dealings with Ven-
ezuela and PDVSA as private secured debts, as trade 
claims for oil deliveries, or as foreign aid. Each 
of these implies a different re-
structuring process, repayment 
priority, recovery value, and 
free-riding opportunity. China, 
Russia, suppliers, or direct in-
vestors could plausibly get paid 
in full from remaining reserves, 
or strip valuable assets. Then 
bondholders, with their state-of-the-art contracts, 
would be left fighting for crumbs.
In the twilight before default, the fact that so 
many contracts are nonexistent or unknown, and 
so many others could be changed retroactively on 
a whim, is a symptom of the continuing deteriora-
tion of the old restructuring institutions.
THE GREEK LABYRINTH
When a newly elected Greek government dis-
covered in 2009 that its predecessors had falsified 
debt and deficit statistics, the country plunged into 
a catastrophic debt crisis that quickly spread across 
Europe. Greece suffered eight years of economic 
collapse, political strife, and societal breakdown. 
At long last, it seems to have turned the corner. In 
December 2017, the government exchanged more 
than $35 billion in old bonds for new ones with 
lower interest rates and longer maturities. It plans 
to “graduate” from the IMF and European rescue 
programs by the fall of 2018, and to sell new debt 
in the capital markets. It has attracted large-scale 
infrastructure investment, notably from China. 
Nonetheless, unemployment lingers above 20 per-
cent, and the total burden of Greek government 
debt ($383 billion in 2017) is stuck at around 180 
percent of gross domestic product; more than two-
thirds is owed to euro area governments and insti-
tutions.
Greek debt to its European neighbors has been 
a source of tension within Europe and between 
Europe and the IMF. The IMF lost face over its fail-
ure to secure more debt relief from Greece’s private 
creditors before 2012, for letting public funds be 
used to repay maturing debts to private creditors 
in 2010–11, and for apparently excessive deference 
to its “troika” partners, the European Commission 
and the ECB, in the Greek program’s design. Since 
2015, the IMF has stood accused of overcompen-
sating for past errors: using its small share of the 
Greek financing package as a platform, the IMF 
has demanded deeper debt relief from euro area 
governments and institutions, and refused to com-
promise on what some European officials saw as 
minor differences in budget assumptions. Critics 
argue that the IMF is needless-
ly dwelling on the size of the 
Greek debt stock, when pay-
ment flows are all that matter.
Euro area members have 
made impressive concessions. 
Public-sector creditors have 
extended maturities and re-
duced interest rates on Greek debt many times 
since the 2012 bond restructuring, so that Greece 
has hardly any payments due to them for years to 
come. This helps explain private creditors’ will-
ingness to buy short- and medium-term Greek 
debt. Researchers estimate that Europe has writ-
ten off more than half of its claims, in present-
value terms.
A recent working paper by the Peterson Insti-
tute for International Economics argues that ex-
tending principal repayment even farther into the 
future, as far as 2080, would help make Greek 
debt sustainable. But apart from disagreement on 
the economic merits of further rescheduling, legal 
and political imperatives prevent European gov-
ernments from admitting to their citizens that they 
have granted any debt relief, lest they be accused 
of subsidizing a profligate neighbor in violation of 
a European treaty prohibition on fiscal transfers. 
The same barriers stand in the way of principal 
reduction.
Debt sustainability analysis that focuses solely 
on payment flows and the present value of Greek 
Bond contracts are  
ill-equipped to manage  
political conflict.
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obligations ignores a central political dimension 
of debt. The debtor-creditor relationship is inher-
ently hierarchical. For Greece, as for many low-
income countries without market access, being in 
debt to governments and international organiza-
tions comes at the cost of policy autonomy.
From the creditors’ perspective this is a neces-
sity, since they do not trust the debtor to manage 
its economy. The debt obligation and the associ-
ated policy conditions offer a means of control. 
For European creditor governments, postponing 
principal repayment has three big advantages over 
principal reduction: it would achieve debt relief 
and facilitate private market access for Greece, es-
tablish a platform to monitor Greek policy perfor-
mance until the debt matures, and allow creditor 
governments to tell their own citizens that they 
are getting repaid in full (at least nominally).
The downside of postponing repayment rather 
than reducing the principal is that it risks perpetu-
ating what has become a toxic debtor-creditor re-
lationship for generations. If the goal is to build 
a healthy political community in Europe, it is far 
from obvious that avoiding bailouts today is worth 
the cost of entrenching inequality in the long run.
UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP
Contrary to the image of a fresh start, debt re-
structuring often reduces policy autonomy for 
sovereign debtors, particularly when the creditors 
are foreign governments or international institu-
tions. Debt problems are presumptively attributed 
to economic mismanagement. It seems axiomatic 
that a durable recovery and a return to debt sus-
tainability require policy reform, which in turn 
requires monitoring and enforcement by someone 
other than the voters who failed at it to begin with. 
The debtor-creditor relationship is well suited to 
the task. 
Conditionality, monitoring, and enforcement are 
not necessarily altruistic. Government creditors are 
in the business of lending taxpayer funds to achieve 
public policy objectives, and are accountable to 
their citizens for the results. They are not neces-
sarily accountable to the borrowing government or 
its people, even though they may effectively take 
over that government’s policy functions, and even 
though citizens of debtor and creditor nations may 
have different policy preferences.
Greece again presents a stark example. Reform 
programs designed by its public sector creditors 
often included assumptions about tax and priva-
tization revenues that were criticized as unreal-
istic and projections of growth, unemployment, 
and market access that turned out to be wrong by 
a wide margin. Multiple studies and internal as-
sessments highlight such errors, which may have 
reflected political pressure, excess optimism, or a 
mix of factors. More recently, Europe and the IMF 
have had trouble agreeing on a single set of as-
sumptions for the Greek program.
The consequences of wrong assumptions and 
bad policy design fall overwhelmingly on the 
debtor, along with the cost of its own poor policy 
performance. Under the circumstances, creditors 
have limited incentives to come up with good 
designs and realistic projections, unless they are 
facing payment default or reputational damage of 
existential proportions.
Contract tools can help reallocate the burden 
of policy design and performance—for example, 
by building in triggers for automatic debt relief if 
policy assumptions turn out to be wildly off the 
mark. Debt relief need not absolve sovereign debt-
ors of the consequences of economic mismanage-
ment, but it can be calibrated to share responsi-
bility more equitably, and to create incentives for 
citizens of creditor countries to hold their own 
representatives to account when they design poli-
cies for citizens of other countries. While public 
sector creditors can profit by adapting private con-
tract techniques, technique can never be the whole 
story. Allocating policy responsibility between 
debtors and creditors, and calibrating loss-sharing 
triggers, are political decisions about distribution. 
Contracts merely implement them.
DEBT POLITICS
Government debt is an inherently political 
and constitutional project. Alexander Hamilton 
famously argued that federal debt would bind a 
loose confederation of states into a nation, and 
help invest the young nation’s commercial elites 
in the fortunes of its federal government. Public 
debt, whether owed to governments or private 
creditors, can serve as the foundation for domes-
tic money and credit, fuel economic and politi-
cal development, and cement international alli-
ances. Foreign debt—owed to the governments 
of France and Spain, and to Dutch bankers—
helped finance US independence from Britain. It 
also featured prominently in nineteenth-century 
colonial conquests and twentieth-century impe-
rial breakups. 
Against this historical background, the rise of 
private contract design to its preeminent place in 
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sovereign debt policy at the start of the twenty-
first century seems anomalous and risky. The 
dominance of private international capital mar-
kets calls for more attention to contracts, but not 
to the exclusion of building public institutions. 
The limits of debt contracts as a policy tool have 
become apparent as the existing regime for sov-
ereign debt restructuring is challenged by the 
demise of legal and geographic boundaries, and 
the rise of new creditors with no stake in old in-
stitutions. Established creditor coordination prac-
tices are breaking down, and the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime suddenly looks fragmented 
and barren, devoid of shared norms and values. 
Neither debtors nor creditors, public or private, 
care to talk about the political core of sovereign 
debt. It brings up uncomfortable questions of le-
gitimacy and distribution, and reveals the limits 
of sovereignty that no one wants to admit. For ex-
perts in finance ministries and international insti-
tutions, politics can be a source of uncertainty and 
an obstacle to optimal technocratic solutions.
The unfolding crisis in Venezuela highlights the 
urgency of addressing sovereign debt politics head 
on. Years spent refining contract terms to smooth 
a consensual restructuring process and rejecting 
calls to institutionalize common standards for re-
sponsible lending and borrowing, including crite-
ria for marking debt issued by oppressive regimes 
as “odious” and making it uncollectable, have left 
the international community ill-prepared to deal 
with a corrupt government that starves its people 
and sells assets in secret to pay its creditors. Is the 
Maduro regime “odious”? Absent international 
consensus on the answer, US bilateral sanctions 
complicate life for the Venezuelan government, 
but they also make for an easy scapegoat and bol-
ster its popularity at home.
Failure to convince new creditors such as China 
that reformed debt-restructuring institutions can 
serve their interests encourages free riding. Why 
should China seek international cooperation to 
collect from Venezuela, Congo, or Angola if it can 
get a better deal on its own, just as the ECB did in 
Greece? Private law doctrines that banished poli-
tics from sovereign-debt contract disputes created 
an opening for Russia to use English courts to ha-
rass Ukraine.
Engagement with politics and public institu-
tion-building does not dictate the embrace of par-
ticular institutional forms, such as treaty-based 
bankruptcy. Puerto Rico’s troubles illustrate that 
bankruptcy as such is not a silver bullet, and that 
political forces can twist bankruptcy tools beyond 
recognition. 
The US Congress wrote a special bankruptcy 
law to help Puerto Rico work its way out from 
under a mountain of debt. The debt itself came 
of decades of mismanagement, which is hard to 
separate from the deeply dysfunctional relation-
ship between the island commonwealth and the 
United States, infected with colonial dominance, 
economic dependency, and distortionary fiscal 
policies. No bankruptcy law can fix all that, and 
the federal law enacted in 2016 does not try. But 
it does go the extra mile for one constituency—
private bondholders—by tiptoeing around such 
basic bankruptcy tasks as gathering all compet-
ing claims in a single process, arranging them in 
an intelligible order of distribution, and overrid-
ing individual contracts to assign each claim a fair 
share of the assets, which would give the island a 
fresh start.
Durable reform requires constituents invested 
in the project. This means, among other things, 
making vast improvements in public disclosure of 
sovereign debt terms and restructuring outcomes, 
developing coordination mechanisms among re-
gional and international safety nets, and elaborat-
ing the standards for debt legitimacy, sanctions, 
and equitable loss sharing.
Public debt cannot be left entirely or even most-
ly to private ordering. It is bigger than any one 
contract dispute. It has too many core constituents 
outside the four corners of the contract, including 
taxpayers, pensioners, government workers, bank 
depositors, and other governments, to name just a 
few. This is not a complex or controversial insight, 
but turning it into tractable policies is technically 
daunting and politically risky. 
Modern sovereign debt history is littered with 
stalled and abandoned treaties and institutions, 
from the League of Nations to the United Nations 
and the IMF. The temptation to turn to private con-
tract adjustment as an alternative is irresistible. It 
is time to recognize this as a false alternative: even 
if it makes good sense as a matter of contract de-
sign and helps buy time for political compromise, 
it can never be that compromise, for the simple 
reason that public debt is irreducibly public. !
